This paper reexamines the relationship between financial market imperfections and economic instability. I present a model in which financial accelerator effects come from adverse selection in credit markets. Unlike other models of the financial accelerator, the model I present has the potential to stabilize the economy rather than destabilize it. The stabilizing forces in the dynamic model are closely related to forces that cause overinvestment in static models. Consequently, the stabilizing properties of the model are not specific to adverse selection but rather are present in any environment in which credit market distortions cause overinvestment. When investment projects are equity financed, or when contracts are written optimally, the only equilibria that emerge are stabilizer equilibria. Thus, stabilizing outcomes are more robust in this model. Finally, the empirical distinction between accelerator equilibria and stabilizer equilibria is subtle. Many statistics used to test for financial accelerators are observationally equivalent in stabilizer equilibria. 
Introduction
The …nancial accelerator hypothesis is that credit market distortions magnify economic shocks. Disturbances that would be small in a world with perfect markets, become exaggerated and prolonged due to imperfections in the credit and loan markets. In other words, credit market distortions destabilize the economy. The …nancial accelerator is an important idea because standard business cycle models require large and persistent disturbances to mimic the business cycles we observe in the data. Without large shocks, these models would generate business cycles that were small and short lived. The …nancial accelerator ampli…es and propagates shocks and, therefore, can potentially explain why business cycles are so signi…cant even though the shocks we observe are relatively small. This paper reexamines the relationship between credit market imperfections and economic instability. I present a model in which adverse selection distorts the loan markets. I embed the adverse selection problem in a dynamic equilibrium model of business cycle ‡uctuations. The paper has three central messages. First, although there are cases in which these distortions are destabilizing, there are other cases in which the distortions cause the economy to be excessively stable. The stabilizing outcomes in the dynamic model are closely related to overinvestment outcomes in static models of credit market failure. Second, if investments are equity …nanced or if borrowers and lenders write optimal contracts, the only equilibria that emerge are the stabilizer equilibria. Finally, in the adverse selection model, the empirical distinction between accelerators and stabilizers is subtle. I show that many of the standard statistics used to detect …nancial accelerators are also consistent with stabilizer equilibria.
One important contribution of this paper is that it decomposes the total ampli…cation caused by the credit market distortion into separate channels. Moreover, each channel, or e¤ect, has economic meaning. This decomposition clari…es the way that credit market distortions amplify shocks.
Speci…cally, in the adverse selection model, a shock that increases entrepreneurs' net worth has three separate e¤ects on investment. First, the increase in internal funds causes the premium on borrowed funds to fall. With a lower premium, investors have a greater incentive to invest. This is the "agency cost" channel that is emphasized in much of the existing literature.
Second, since borrowers internalize more of the costs and bene…ts of their projects when their net worth is higher, the level of investment is closer to the e¢cient level. In some settings this causes investment to increase; in others investment may fall. This second e¤ect is the dynamic counterpart of over-or underinvestment in static adverse selection models. If there is underinvestment in the static environment, investment will rise when internal funds increase. In the dynamic model, this will cause shocks to be ampli…ed. If there is overinvestment in the static environment, investment falls when internal funds increase. Consequently, in the associated dynamic model, the …nancial market imperfections mitigate shocks.
Finally, the allocation of investment becomes more e¢cient when internal funds rise. Investment increases for projects with high expected returns and falls for projects with low expected returns. So, even if the total volume of investment does not change, shocks will be ampli…ed because investment is allocated more appropriately.
The total e¤ect on investment is the sum of these three e¤ects. I show that it is possible for the second e¤ect to be negative and to dominate the other two. In such cases, the adverse selection problem ine¢ciently stabilizes the economy. This duality between stabilization in dynamic models, and overinvestment in static models, has not been pointed out by the existing literature.
I show that accelerator equilibria are not robust to other forms of …nanc-ing. Speci…cally, when I allow for either equity …nance or for optimal contracting by borrowers and lenders, the only equilibria that occur are stabilizer equilibria. Furthermore, the stabilizer equilibria do not have any overtly counterfactual implications (such as a procyclical interest rate spread). The empirical distinction between stabilizers and accelerators, in this model, is subtle. Many well known empirical …ndings that have been cited as evidence for a …nancial accelerator are consistent with the stabilizer equilibria in this model. This suggests that stabilizing outcomes are not mere curiosities.
Understanding the dynamic adverse selection model is easiest if we …rst examine two static adverse selection environments. These static models are the building blocks for the dynamic model that is analyzed later.
Static Models of Adverse Selection in Credit Markets
In general, credit market imperfections can result in either overinvestment or underinvestment. In the adverse selection model, over-or underinvestment is determined by the distribution of investment opportunities. The basic intuition can be seen by comparing two polar cases: the Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] model (hereafter 'SW') and the De Meza and Webb [1987] model (hereafter 'DW'). This section contains a brief analysis of these models since the behavior of these simple static models will provide important insights into the behavior of the dynamic model analyzed later.
Basic Setup
I start by describing the features of the models that are common to both SW and DW. Consider a two period world in which entrepreneurs interact with savers. Normalize the number of entrepreneurs to be 1 and assume that savers supply S > 1 inelastically. The savers have a safe outside option that yields a gross rate of return of ¹ ½ > 0. Competition ensures that the rate of return in the credit market will also be ¹ ½. Let R be the rate of interest charged to the entrepreneurs: The only di¤erence between ¹ ½ and R is default risk, ¢; thus, ¢ is the interest rate spread, ¹ ½ = R [1 ¡ ¢]. I will refer to ¹ ½ as the "safe" interest rate and R as the "risky" interest rate.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and care only about consumption in the second period. Each entrepreneur has a project which either succeeds or fails. There are three numbers associated with each project; the probability of success p, the payo¤ in the event of success x, and the expected payo¤ r = px. The distribution of projects can be described by a joint distribution f over any two of these numbers since the third is redundant.
Activating a project requires an investment of one unit in the …rst period. Entrepreneurs have personal, "internal" funds of w. Assume that w < 1 so that they cannot self-…nance. If the entrepreneurs want to activate a project, they have to borrow 1 ¡ w ("external" funds) in the credit market.
Importantly, entrepreneurs know the characteristics of their projects while savers do not; this is the source of asymmetric information in the model. In addition, borrowers have limited liability. If a project fails, the lenders cannot extract further payments from the entrepreneur. For the time being, I assume that all credit market interactions are described by standard debt contracts. Optimal contracting is discussed later.
Note that as the risky interest rate (R) changes, the pool of borrowers changes. An increase in R will discourage some entrepreneurs from investing. It could be the case that relatively more safe borrowers leave the loan pool so that ¢ increases as R increases. If more risky borrowers leave, then ¢ will fall as R rises. Writing ¢(R) as a function of R allows explicitly for this e¤ect. In equilibrium
One can view ¢(R) as a function that captures the important features of the adverse selection problem. As a technical matter, the derivative of ½(R) will be positive in any equilibrium. Let ½ 0 denote this derivative.
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The equilibrium will depend critically on the distribution of projects. It is along this dimension that SW and DW di¤er.
Stiglitz and Weiss go to the bank
In Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] , all of the projects have the same expected return r but di¤er in their success probability p. The expected return to an entrepreneur to activating their project is r ¡ pR(1 ¡ w). This is decreasing in p; so payo¤s are higher if the agent has a riskier project. Thus, there is a cuto¤ probability;p; such that all agents with p <p choose to apply for credit. If there is anyone at all in the loan pool, it is the "risky tail" of the distribution. See …gure 1.A.
Since the entrepreneurs have the option to save w at the safe rate ¹ ½, the cuto¤ probability,p; solves w¹ ½ = r ¡pR(1 ¡ w). In equilibrium
Typically, there is underinvestment in the SW model.
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The reason for the underinvestment is simple. Consider the entrepreneur at the cuto¤p. This is the safest project in the pool. If you could identify this entrepreneur, you would o¤er him a low interest rate since it is relatively unlikely that he will default. Unfortunately, this project is lost among the other riskier projects and gets an interest rate that is appropriate for the average riskiness of the loan pool. Thus the marginal entrepreneur's incentive to invest is too low.
Notice that investment rises as the level of internal funds increases. For any given R; the cuto¤ probability,p; is increasing in w. Since total investment consists of all entrepreneurs with p <p; investment increases with w.
1 There will never be credit rationing in this economy. The safe saving option pins down the rate of return in the credit market and e¤ectively rules out rationing. For a formal proof of this and that ½ 0 > 0 in equilibrium, see House [2000] . As in Mankiw [1986] , it is possible for the credit market to be completely shut down. I restrict my analysis to equilibria in which this is not the case.
2 If r < ¹ ½ then it is optimal to have no investment and this will be the case.
. If r > r ¤ thenp = 1 and all projects are activated (which is optimal since r > ¹ ½. If ¹ ½ < r < r ¤ then 0 <p < 1 and there is underinvestment.
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The main points about the SW model are summarized below:
In the SW economies, the equilibria involve underinvestment. Only the riskiest projects are undertaken. Furthermore, increases in internal …nancing increase investment.
De Meza and Webb go to the bank
At the other extreme is the distribution considered by De Meza and Webb [1987] .
Here, all projects have the same actual outcome x if they succeed. As in the SW model, projects di¤er in their probability of success p. The expected payo¤ to an entrepreneur who activates his project is p [x ¡ R(1 ¡ w)] which is increasing in p. Again there will be a cuto¤p but now the projects that activate are those with p¸p so that we get the "safe tail". See …gure 1.B. The cuto¤ satis…eŝ
In this case,
It is easy to show that ¹ ½¸px so that the expected return on the marginal project is below its social opportunity cost. Thus, in DW, there is overinvestment. This intuition is similar; the marginal project is the riskiest project and "deserves" a high interest rate. This entrepreneur is hiding among the other safer projects and thus gets an unreasonably low interest rate. Consequently, the incentives to invest for the projects at the margin are too high. Unlike the SW model, increases in internal funds cause reductions in investment. Again,p is increasing in w but since investment consists of all entrepreneurs with p >p; investment falls as w rises.
In the DW economies, equilibria involve overinvestment. Selection is toward the safer projects and increases in internal funds reduce investment.
General Distributions
General distributions have mixed results. Nevertheless, it is useful to ask how to distinguish underinvestment equilibria from overinvestment equilibria.
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Consider any joint density function f (r; p). For any p de…ner(p) as:
This is the cuto¤ expected return for projects that are successful with probability p given the interest rate R. Any entrepreneur with a project (r; p) for which r¸r(p) will …nd it pro…table to invest. In equilibrium, the diversi…ed rate of return in the credit market must be equal to the safe rate of return.
¢ depends on R; ¹ ½, and w since the cuto¤sr(p) depend on those variables. Consider the change in output caused by increasing investment by a small amount dI > 0. The opportunity cost of activating a project is ¹ ½. At the margin, the expected payo¤ of a project isr (p). The change in output is then
f(r; p)dp¸dI:
, the change in output can be expressed as:
The derivative of ¢(¢) with respect to ½ is:
f(r; p)dr o dp and @r(p) @½ = w 8p. Consequently, the sign of @¢ @½ distinguishes overinvestment models from underinvestment ones. Increases in ¹ ½ discourage investment. In SW, the marginal investors have the safest projects so an increase in ¹ ½ increases the default rate by "chasing away" the safe projects. In DW, the marginal projects are the riskiest ones so increasing ¹ ½ lowers the default rate.
In general, any change in investment improves welfare only if the loan pool becomes safer. It is easy to show that @¢ @w < 0 for any distribution. Increasing internal funds always makes the pool safer and therefore necessarily improves e¢ciency. If internal funds increased to the point where entrepreneurs could self…nance, the equilibrium cuto¤s would ber(p) = ¹ ½ and the market would be e¢cient.
Adverse Selection and Credit Markets Dynamics
This section presents a dynamic model of credit market failure. One of the nice features of the model is that it permits a decomposition of the dynamic e¤ects of the adverse selection problem into components that have economic meaning. Speci…cally, an increase in internal funds has three separate e¤ects on dynamics. More internal funds reduces the interest premium, which stimulates investment; it causes more e¢cient use of investment and, more internal funds causes the level of investment to move towards the e¢cient level.
Setup
The economy consists of overlapping generations of two period lived agents. Each generation has savers and entrepreneurs. The number of entrepreneurs is normalized to 1.
As before, entrepreneurs are risk neutral and only value consumption in the second period of life. The entrepreneurs invest in projects that, if successful, yield productive capital in the following period. Capital fully depreciates after use, so the payo¤ to having one unit of capital is just its marginal product. The project distribution is described by f(p; k), where k is the expected capital payo¤ and p is the probability of success. Each project requires an initial investment of one unit of the consumption good. Entrepreneurs supply one unit of labor in youth and receive wages w t . Entrepreneurs are the only agents who supply labor.
All agents have access to a safe investment technology that yields ¹ ½ goods in period t + 1. Note that the safe savings technology does not produce capital. Rather it simply yields units of consumable output the period after the saving took place. This implies that the entire capital stock comes from the market with the adverse selection problem. In a model with additional capital markets that are free of distortions, one would expect a signi…cant amount of substitution between the two markets which would partially o¤set the dynamic e¤ects of the credit market frictions.
Entrepreneurs can either save their income (w t ) to get w t ¹ ½ or they can borrow 1 ¡ w t and …nance their project. I restrict attention to equilibria in which w is strictly less than 1 so that entrepreneurs cannot self …nance.
Consider a group of projects with the same probability of success, p (a cross section of the joint density f ). The cuto¤ project for this group,k (p) ; will satisfŷ
where r t+1 is the marginal product of capital in the next period. This is the dynamic version of equation (2. for all p but these are not the equilibrium cuto¤s. The critical values di¤er from the e¢cient cuto¤s by an amount that is proportional to the amount of external …nancing. As internal funds increase, the cuto¤s "move towards" the e¢cient cuto¤s. Projects that are pulling the average payo¤ up (i.e. for which pR t > ¹ ½) set a cuto¤ that is too high. Projects that have expected returns that are less than the average return ¹ ½ have cuto¤s that are too low. Projects for which p = (1 ¡ ¢) are the only ones for whichk = ¹ ½ r . Consider again a cross-section of the distribution f for a given p. All projects for which k >k(p) are activated. By the law of large numbers the contribution to the capital stock next period from this slice of the distribution is R 1
kf(k; p)dk. To get the total capital stock next period, simply sum over all of the p's to get:
Competitive …rms produce output according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
where z t is productivity at date t. Factor demands satisfy:
Finally, the no-arbitrage condition is:
pf(k; p)dkdp are the total investment (I) and the total measure of successful projects (A) respectively. I assume the existence of a steady state equilibrium characterized by the constant values K; w; r; A; I ; ¢: 
Dynamics
To generate dynamics in the model, assume that the economy is subjected to shocks to the technology parameter z and that this process follows an AR(1) process:
where q is the autoregressive root and v t is i.i.d.
To analyze the dynamic behavior of the model, I take log-linear approximations of these equations in the neighborhood of a (stable) steady state. Linearizing (3.2) gives:
where 'x' denotes the percent deviation of the variable x from its steady state value. Since ½ t = ¹ ½ in every period we have1 t =R t +Ã t ¡Ĩ t = 0: This implies:
4 Existence is not guaranteed. Given K we have w; r; and ¢(R; w; r) that are continuous in K but the equilibrium interest rate R is the minimum R such that ¹ ½ = R [1 ¡ ¢(¢)]. In general, this R will not be continuous in K. In addition, it is possible that the mapping K ! K 0 has downward jumps; thus existence arguments using continuity or monotonicity do not work.
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The denominator is the derivative of R [1 ¡ ¢(¢)] with respect to R which is simply ½ 0 and in equilibrium must be positive. Finally:
The equations: (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7), characterize the local dynamics of the system. Appendix A.1. shows that this system can be reduced to the following expression in which the total e¤ect of a productivity shock is decomposed into …ve components:
"Perfect Information Dynamics"
(3.8)
Here " IR < 0 is the interest elasticity of investment demand. In the static models, the function ¢(¢) described the relevant adverse selection e¤ects in the environment. Not surprisingly, the dynamic system is also governed by the …rst order properties of this function. Equation (3.8) describes the dynamic evolution of the capital stock. The …rst term in the equation is the normal change in investment that occurs under full information. The other terms represent deviations from the full information path caused by the adverse selection problem.
The additional terms are grouped according to whether they result from changes in internal funds (w t ) or changes in the expected future marginal product of capital (r t+1 ). Because …nancial accelerator theories emphasize changes in internal funds, I focus on the terms that interact withw t and only brie ‡y discuss the e¤ects of changes inr t+1 .
The second term in equation (3.8) is the Agency Cost E¤ect. As cash ‡ow increases, the pool becomes safer and the premium on external …nance falls. The lower interest rates stimulate investment which ampli…es the shock. The sign of the coe¢cient is positive since for any distribution, @¢ @w is negative (increases in internal funds always make the pool safer) as is the interest elasticity of investment, " IR . As a result, this channel always serves to amplify disturbances. This term captures the e¤ect emphasized by Bernanke and Gertler [1989] . 6 The magnitude of the agency cost e¤ect depends on the absolute values of @¢ @w and " IR . If investment is very sensitive to interest rate changes and if the interest rate is very sensitive to changes in internal funds then the agency cost e¤ect will contribute signi…cantly to dynamics.
The third term in equation (3.8) represents the direct a¤ect of additional internal funds on investment even if the interest rate (R) stays the same. I call this the Investment E¤ect since it is the dynamic analog of the e¤ect that internal funds had on investment in the static model. The sign of this e¤ect is the same as the sign of @¢ @½ . This is the same moment that di¤erentiated overinvestment settings from underinvestment settings in the static models. Distributions that give rise to underinvestment in equilibrium will have @¢ @½ > 0. If there is overinvestment in a static model (like DW) then @¢ @½ < 0: For models like the SW model, this channel will impart additional accelerator dynamics to the system. In environments similar to DW, this e¤ect will cause entrepreneurs to reduce investment and will have a stabilizing e¤ect on the economy. I call the fourth term an E¢ciency Gain. Like the agency cost e¤ect, this e¤ect depends on @¢ @w . Since @¢ @w is always negative, this e¤ect will be positive and will amplify shocks. Intuitively, even if there is no change in the level of investment, there is a bene…cial change in the composition of investment. More precisely, @¢ @w quanti…es the increase in e¢ciency that comes from an increase in internal funds (see Appendix A.2).
The last term, the Payo¤ E¤ect, represents the adverse selection e¤ects coming from expected changes in the future payo¤ to capital (the future marginal product of capital). The net e¤ect is determined by the moments @¢ @r and @¢ @½ . Like changes in w; changes in r a¤ect dynamics by causing changes in investment and by altering the composition of investment. Looking at the coe¢cient onr t+1 ; the reader can see that for every term that interacts withw t ; there is an associated interaction withr t+1 .
The total e¤ect on the system is the sum of these components. Previous models emphasized the agency cost channel which is always positive. In the adverse selection model, it is immediately apparent that the other components in equation (3.8) may work to further magnify a shock (as in a SW case) or may work to dampen the e¤ect of a shock (as in a DW case). It is possible to have a stabilizing e¤ect that is so strong that the overall adverse selection e¤ect from a positive productivity shock is negative. One example of such a case would be when f (k; p) corresponds to a pure DW distribution (i.e. all of the projects have the same actual payo¤ x when they succeed).
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This implies that the impulse response function for the capital stock (and for output) is below that of the full information economy.
It should be pointed out that there is no reason to believe, a priori, that, in reality, the agency cost e¤ect is larger than the investment e¤ect and the e¢ciency gain. In fact, since empirical estimates of " IR are typically low, the agency cost e¤ect may not be very strong in reality. If this is the case, one should expect the other channels to be at least as important in shaping the economy's actual response to a shock.
It is important to emphasize that the possibility of a …nancial stabilizer is general and does not depend on adverse selection per se. Only two conditions are required for stabilization. First, market imperfections must be able to cause overinvestment. Second, the behavior of the entrepreneurs must "improve" when their net worth rises. Many models with rational agents have this second property. When agents internalize more of the costs and bene…ts of their decisions, their actions are more e¢cient. The …rst property (overinvestment), is also not uncommon. Existing …nancial accelerator models have the second property but not the …rst (costly-state-veri…cation always causes underinvestment). As a result, these models always amplify shocks. 8 7 Intuitively, in DW economies, the only way for the agency cost erfect and e¢ciency gain to have the right sign, is if the equilibrium volume of investment falls when internal funds rise. It is not di¢cult to verify this mathematically, a proof is available from the author by request.
8 Jensen [1986] and Malmendier and Tate [2001] present models that have the …rst property but not the second. In these cases, …rms behave worse when internal funds rise. In Jensen [1986] , this is because managers incentives di¤er from the …rm's incentives. In Malmendier and Tate [2001] , managers are irrationally "overcon…dent".
Simulations.
For numerical simulations, one needs to specify the precise form of the distribution. To allow for some ‡exibility in distributional choice, assume that (p; k) is distributed according to a log bivariate normal distribution.
Although this is restrictive, it does allow for a considerable degree of ‡exibility in the distribution and is not too hard to work with. The remaining parameters are ¹ ½ = 1:01; q = :95 and ® = :35. Although these are standard values used in RBC models, the model here is much too stylized to a¤ord a direct comparison with actual data. The details of the numerical simulations are contained in Appendix B.
The …rst example considers an underinvestment case similar to the SW model. The …rst order components of the function ¢ are given in the following table together with the …rst order terms in the subsequent simulation: Table 1 The equilibrium response of the capital stock to a 1% improvement in technology is shown in …gure 2, along with the response that would occur under perfect information. The equilibrium response of capital is much greater than the perfect information response. This is because all of the ampli…cation forces are pushing in the same direction. The bottom two panels in …gure 2. show the responses of the interest rate and investment. Investment increases by roughly 1% in response to the 1% improvement in productivity. Only some of this is due to the agency cost e¤ect. Since the interest elasticity of investment demand is -1 (see the table above) and the loan rate R falls by roughly .23%, the agency cost e¤ect causes total investment to rise by at most .23%. In fact it is less than this since the equilibrium fall in interest rates is only partially due to increased internal funds. Figure 3 decomposes the total equilibrium e¤ect on the capital stock into its various components. To …nd each piece, I use the equilibrium realizations of prices fR t ; w t ; r t g 8t and solve for the total amount of accumulation that comes from each part of equation (3.8) separately. The total response of the capital stock is the sum of these components. The agency cost e¤ect in this example is signi…cant. It causes the capital stock to rise by roughly .12% more than it would if the loan markets functioned e¢ciently. The largest ampli…cation channel in this example is the "investment e¤ect". This channel accounts for almost half of the equilibrium change in investment. 10 11 Figure 4 shows the equilibrium responses to the same 1% technology shock when there is overinvestment. The equilibrium response of the system is below the response in the perfect information environment. This is due to the overinvestment in the steady state (note that @¢ @½ is negative in Table 1 ). As their internal funds rise, managers and entrepreneurs think more carefully about which projects to activate. Since they were overinvesting in the steady state, they actually reduce investment as their cash ‡ow rises. Figure 5 decomposes the aggregate e¤ect into its components. Stabilization in this example comes from both the negative payo¤ e¤ect as well as the "investment e¤ect". The "investment e¤ect" causes capital to fall by .6% while the "payo¤ e¤ect" reduces capital by .18%.
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It is worth pointing out that the interest rate on risky loans (R) falls in both cases. Increases in internal funds always reduces risk in the loan pool and consequently, always drives interest rates down. Thus the correlation between changes in output with changes in interest rate spreads and default risk cannot be used as evidence of either stabilizers or accelerators since both theories are consistent with this feature of the data.
10 This is not a general result. In other cases (cases in which " IR is large) the "agency cost e¤ect" can dominate the other e¤ects. 11 The alert reader will notice that the perfect information response in …gure 3 di¤ers from the perfect information response in the upper panel of …gure 2. The discrepancy is due to the fact that I am using the "adverse selection" price path fR; w; rg in …gure 3 while in …gure 2 I generate the actual equilibrium path under perfect information. 12 In stabilizer cases it is common to have a negative "payo¤ e¤ect". When the marginal product of capital (r) rises, investment should increase. Because the marginal projects are riskier than the average projects, the in ‡ow of risky projects causes the default rate to rise which raises R and curtails investment. Recalling that "overinvestment" implies that @ ¢ @ ½ < 0; the reader can verify that every term in the "payo¤ e¤ect" in (3.8) is negative.
Equity Financing and Optimal Contracting
One objection to the model above is that the contracts are restricted to standard debt contracts. This subsection analyzes the equity …nancing as well as the optimal contracting problem. Allowing agents to issue equity or to write optimal contracts with their lenders will change the equilibrium dynamics of the system.
Equity
Suppose that entrepreneurs …nance their projects with equity rather than debt. Let ¼ t be the price for a share of a project. The agent needs to raise 1 ¡ w t external funds to …nance the project so he must sell ³ t = 1¡wt ¼ shares. The payo¤ to investing for any entrepreneur is r t+1 k [1 ¡ ³ t ] so for any project (k; p) all that matters for an investor is k. This payo¤ is clearly increasing in k so any k >k will issue shares and get …nancing. The criticalk satis…es
(note that the term in brackets must be positive otherwise no entrepreneur will invest). The e¢cient cuto¤s are
and require ¼ t = 1 In equilibrium, the return on a diversi…ed portfolio of stocks must be:
where »(k) and ¥ (k) are, respectively, the marginal density of k and the cumulative marginal distribution of k associated with the joint density f (k; p) ;
f (k; p) dp o dk: In equilibrium, the diversi…ed return is at least as great as the return on the marginal project.
Using the de…nition ofk:
(there is overinvestment).
Note that the marginal project (k) is the least productive project. Because the price of equity re ‡ects the average return on investment, the marginal …rm is able to raise funds to too easily.k is increasing in w so as internal funds increase, investment contracts (given r t+1 ; and ¼ t ). Thus in the simple equity model, there is overinvestment in the steady state and the adverse selection problem stabilizes the economy.
Optimal Contracts
Neither equity nor standard debt contracts are optimal in this model. This section analyzes the optimal contracting problem. Speci…cally, I consider an environment in which banks write contracts to screen potential borrowers. Two things are immediately apparent about the form of an optimal contract. First, since project outcomes are observable, an optimal contract will make interest payments conditional on the ex post realization of the project (x). Instead of repaying R if a project succeeds, the borrower will repay R(x).
Second, the lenders may also attempt to screen borrowers ex ante by o¤ering a menu of contracts fR(x); cg where c is the entrepreneurs contribution to the funding of their own project. Intuitively, the adverse selection problem will be less severe if the borrower contributes more of their own funds to the project. Since entrepreneurs only have w; we require c · w for every active contract.
Banks are competitive. In equilibrium, every active contract will earn the rate of return ¹ ½ per unit lent. Appendix C shows that the optimal contract is given by fR(x); wg for every x. The lenders condition the interest payment on the project outcome and require the entrepreneurs to contribute all of their internal funds to the project. Projects in outcome group x all get standard debt contracts with a common interest payment R(x). Thus, the optimal contract has both debt and equity features.
This implies that for any distribution f (
; p), the markets e¤ectively separate the distribution into a set of distinct markets ff x (p)g 8x where each univariate distribution f x (p) is a "slice" of f( x p ; p). Thus, optimal contracting breaks the original adverse selection problem (with distribution f ( x p ; p)) into a set of De Meza-Webb economies each with distribution f x (p). Furthermore, we already know that the DW economies are stabilizers in the dynamic environment.
Discussion
The results of the optimal contracting problem and the model with equity …nance are summarized below:
If the projects are equity …nanced or if borrowers and lenders write optimal contracts, then for any distribution of projects f , the only equilibria are stabilizers.
Said another way, both equity …nancing and optimal contracting eliminate all of the accelerator equilibria. Every equilibrium is a stabilizer. This implies that, to a certain extent, the stabilizer equilibria are more robust than the accelerator equilibria.
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In reality, many small business loans are characterized by contracts that have both debt and equity features.
14 If the business "fails" the lenders are still the residual claimants. If the business "succeeds" then the …nanciers are paid an amount that increases with the degree of success. These contracts are similar to the optimal contracts in this model. The contracts here di¤er from equity because payo¤s may be non-increasing in the outcome x. If the default rate for one group (x) is lower than another (x 0 ), then R(x) < R(x 0 ) even if x 0 > x. In addition to the screening contracts considered here, one could consider a signaling game in which entrepreneurs choose their collateral and then the …rms o¤er interest rates R(x) once they have observed the collateral. This setup, in which the more informed parties choose the collateral, will also eliminate the accelerator equilibria. 15 reviews some of the empirical work on the …nancial accelerator and relates it to the adverse selection model. Figure 4 plots the interest rate spread between BAA rated bonds and 10 year treasury bills verses detrended industrial production. The spread is clearly countercyclical. There are many possible explanations for this pattern. When business conditions are unfavorable, it is more likely for …rms to go bankrupt. As a result, loans made during a recession will come with a higher risk premium. In addition, in recessions, internal funds are lower. This exacerbates agency costs, adverse selection problems and moral hazard problems associated with lending and thus also requires a higher premium.
Interest Rate Spreads
Some researchers argue that the countercyclicality of the spread may be indicative of a …nancial propagation mechanism.
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In the adverse selection model, the correlation between the spread and economic activity is not useful in determining whether there is a …nancial accelerator. This is true even when the changes in the spread are due entirely to changes in market distortions. When internal funds increase, the loan pool always becomes safer. Thus, even though the model can stabilize shocks, the default rate, and consequently the spread, always moves in the right direction. Gertler and Gilchrist [1994] compare the behavior of small …rms to large …rms. They argue that small …rms are more dependent on bank loans than larger …rms which have access to bond markets. This suggests that small …rms face signi…-cant market distortions while large …rms have to overcome smaller informational hurdles. The authors …nd that sales for small …rms are much more volatile than for large …rms. They conclude that …nancial accelerator e¤ects are quantitatively signi…cant.
Access to Bond Markets
There would be reasons to question this result if the data were generated by an adverse selection model. To reach their conclusion, Gertler and Gilchrist [1994] assume that the equilibrium distortions in the provision of bank loans are more signi…cant than the distortions in the bond markets. This may or may not be true in reality. It is possible that the bond markets are the ones with the market imperfection while the intermediated loans are not. Consider the following scenario: Banks have a costly technology that reveals a …rms type perfectly. Informational problems are severe for small …rms so that all of their loans are intermediated. These problems are not severe for large …rms so they can issue bonds. In equilibrium, small …rms get intermediated loans but behave e¢ciently while the large …rms make decisions that are distorted. This would reverse Gertler and Gilchrist's conclusion.
The Flight to Quality
In recessions, the ratio of safe loans to risky loans increases. This pattern is called the " ‡ight to quality" and some researchers see it as evidence of a …nancial accelerator.
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Again, the ‡ight to quality is potentially able to distinguish between the two cases. But, to do so, the econometrician must know which markets are the "high quality" ones and which ones are not. Speci…cally, he must know if funds are ‡owing from markets with relatively high informational frictions to markets with relatively lower frictions.
If the low default rate markets are the ones with less distortion, then the ‡ight to quality suggests an accelerator. However, it is possible that markets with high levels of distortion in equilibrium are markets with low default rates. If the high default rate markets have less distortion, then the distortions could be stabilizing.
Cash-Flow Sensitivity
One test that would be able to correctly discriminate between stabilizer equilibria and accelerator equilibria is cash- ‡ow sensitivity analysis. In this model, if entrepreneurs received an exogenous increase in internal funds, one would only have to observe how they altered their investment behavior. If they increase investment then there is a …nancial accelerator.
An endogenous increase in cash ‡ow has two separate e¤ects on investment. First, increases in internal funds signal that there should be more investment even under perfect information. Second, there are the e¤ects of …nancial market imperfections. Empirically, it is di¢cult to separate these two e¤ects.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson [1987] propose regressing a …rm's investment on Tobin's Q and on cash ‡ow.
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If the coe¢cient on cash ‡ow is signi…cant then, they argue that this suggests that there are …nancial market imperfections. Most regressions of this type …nd positive cash ‡ow e¤ects.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995] …nd evidence that …rms that they identify ex ante as …nancially constrained have high cash ‡ow sensitivities. However, among the unconstrained groups they …nd that …rms that have access to the bond market have a negative cash ‡ow sensitivity.
Kaplan and Zingales [1997] argue that cash ‡ow regressions cannot shed any light on the presence of …nancial market imperfections. To support their claim they present detailed evidence showing that …rms that were identi…ed as …nan-cially unconstrained actually had the highest cash ‡ow sensitivities. Erickson and Whited [2000] argue that, once one corrects for measurement error in Q, cash ‡ow does not matter in investment regressions at all. As with Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995] , and Kaplan and Zingales [1997] , Erickson and Whited also get several negative cash- ‡ow sensitivity estimates and …nd that the …rms that are classi…ed as uncontstrained have greater cash ‡ow sensitivity than the …nancially constrained …rms.
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Although cash ‡ow sensitivity is a direct test for …nancial accelerator e¤ects, the results are mixed and the approach is somewhat controversial. 
Summary
The evidence pointing to the presence of a …nancial accelerator is mixed. While the cash ‡ow sensitivity tests can, in principle, distinguish between stabilizers and accelerators, the results of these tests are not consistent across studies. In addition to the di¢cult task of correctly identifying exogenous shocks to cash ‡ow, researchers occasionally obtain negative cash ‡ow e¤ects in these regressions. These results are often treated as aberrations. The other tests are either observationally equivalent in the stabilizer settings or they require some special knowledge on the part of the econometrician.
Related Literature
The term …nancial accelerator was coined by Bernanke and Gertler [1989] . In their model, costly state veri…cation problems cause the distortions in the credit market. In costly state veri…cation models, lenders incur costs to monitor the behavior of their borrowers.
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Although Bernanke and Gertler emphasized that costly state veri…cation is only one possible source of credit market failure, most of the subsequent literature has continued to focus on this case. 22 The literature on credit market frictions in dynamic settings has grown signi…cantly since the paper by Bernanke and Gertler [1989] . Fuerst [1995] was an early attempt to quantify the …nancial accelerator. Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997] expanded on this work by allowing the entrepreneurs in their model to be long lived. This modi…cation (suggested by Gertler [1995] ) introduced a positive autocorrelation to output growth that is not usually found in business cycle models but that does appear in the data. Although the model could generate "hump-shaped" output dynamics, it was still incapable of causing much ampli…cation.
23 Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1998] provide models with signi…cant accelerator e¤ects. The crucial feature of these models is the role of leverage in increasing the volatility of internal funds. Eisfeldt [1999] considers adverse selection in the market for claims to ongoing projects. She assumes that in expansions, idiosyncractic income becomes more volatile. Consequently, agents sell claims to good projects more often. This reduces the "lemons premium", and increases investment. 21 See Townsend [1979] and Gale and Hellwig [1985] for the original analysis of costly state verri…cation model. 22 Bernanke and Gertler [1990] and Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] are important departures from the costly state veri…cation framework. 23 One might argue that stabilizers have been present in some of the earlier models but this is not really the case. In Fuerst [1995] and Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997] , for some parameters the impulse response for the constrained model is below the that of the full information model. This is because their accelerator mechanism also introduces an adjustment cost. The telling feature of an accelerator is how increases in internal funds a¤ect investment. In both of these models, exogenous increases in net worth cause increases in investment. These models look like stabilizers because the adjustment cost feature is overpowering the accelerator feature. Baccetta and Caminal [2000] claim to have a model with a …nancial stabilizer. In their stabilizers, shocks that cause output to expand in the full information environment are constructed to have a negative in ‡uence on internal funds. Thus, their model has only the standard accelerator e¤ect. In all of these "arti…cial" stabilizers, the models have the conterfactual implication that the spread moves procyclically. Jensen [1986] o¤ers a di¤erent rationale for "cash ‡ow sensitivity" …ndings. He argues that …rm's managers are tempted to invest when the …rm has cash on hand even if the projects are not economically viable. Thus, rather than appealing to credit market distortions, Jensen argues that principal-agent problems within the …rm cause cash ‡ow sensitivity.
In addition to the theoretical literature their is also a large, and growing body of empirical work on credit markets and business cycles. Good summaries are found in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1996] and Gertler [1988] . Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox [1993] show that following a monetary contraction, the ratio of commercial paper issuances to bank loans rises. More broadly, Lang and Nakamura [1992] show that the ratio of low risk loans to high risk loans moves countercyclically. Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel [1995] provide evidence on the countercyclicality of commercial paper issues. They argue that this is partly to …nance trade credit for …rms without access to bond markets.
In a recent paper, Malmendier and Tate [2001] argue that CEO's overinvest in their own projects. They show that many CEO's in Fortune 500 companies repeatedly buy stock in their own company for their personal portfolios. This suggests that these CEO's are too con…dent and have a tendency to overinvest. 
Conclusions
This paper analyzes a model in which adverse selection causes credit market distortions. These distortions have several e¤ects on the dynamic response of the model to economic shocks. The total e¤ect of the adverse selection problem can be broken down into components that have economic interpretations. This decomposition provides a window into the workings of dynamic models of …nancial market imperfections. In particular, the decomposition shows that there is a direct connection between overinvestment and underinvestment in static models and stabilizers and accelerators in dynamic models. This possibility for ine¢cient stabilization of economic shocks is not present in existing dynamic models of credit market imperfections. In the model I consider, equity …nancing, or optimal contracting between borrowers and lenders, eliminate all of the accelerator equilibria for any speci…cation of the model. In these cases, the stabilizer outcomes are the only possible equilibria under such contracting.
Empirically, the evidence in favor of a …nancial accelerator is mixed. Although suggestive, none of the statistics considered so far can be o¤ered as conclusive evidence of a …nancial accelerator.
Financial market imperfections can cause the economy to be ine¢ciently stable. The potential for a stabilizing outcome is present in any setting with overinvestment in the steady state. The fact that it is di¢cult to distinguish the stabilizers from the accelerators in data suggests that more care should be taken before concluding that credit market frictions are a destabilizing feature of the economy.
Appendices
Appendix A.1 : Deriving Equation (3.8)
Combining equation (3.3) with (3.4) we get:
t+1 + w @k @w tw t # dp Gathering the coe¢cients onr t+1 andw t gives:
Notice that for any variable x:
@k @x dp
@k @x dp so that:
Then, the coe¢cient onr t+1 is given by:
nd the coe¢cient onw t is:
ombining these and factoring out I, gives:
gives:
Note that:
r dp and
r dp
Recalling the expression for @ ¢ @ ½ implies:
which is rearranged to get equation (3.8).
Appendix A.2. : The E¢ciency Gain E¤ect.
Assume that the increase in internal funds does not increase investment, then:
This implies that:
¾ dp
For any x we have:
" @k @x # dp using the expression for @k @ R , the second term in the sum is: sing the de…nition of ½ 0 ,
so the percentage change in K due to a percentage change in w conditional on dI = 0 is
which is the e¢ciency gain e¤ect.
Within each strip ln kj ln ³ p 1¡p´» N (¹ k jp ; ¾ 2 k jp ) where
Conditional on the success probability p, the conditional distribution obeys:
Since there are 20 cross-sections:
! where
where © is the standard normal distribution: Then K is governed by:
where f j is the p.d.f. of the j th log normal (i.e. f j (x) = Á ³ ln x¡¹ ¾´1 x 1 ¾ where Á is the normal density). Given R; w; r; ½ one can constructk(p j ) from (3.1). I can then use MATLAB quadrature subroutines to …nd the 20 I's and the value for K as described above. Clearly w and r (and indirectly R) will all depend on the capital stock. Thus the problem becomes …nding a …xed point in K. The solution proceeds as follows.
First guess a value for the steady state capital stock K: This will imply w and r. With these values I perform a grid search to …nd the associated equilibrium R. Speci…cally, I pick R and formk(p j ) for j = 1:::20. . The equilibrium will be the smallest R such that ½(R) = ½ (the exogenously speci…ed safe rate of return). With this R I can construct the an associated I 0 ; and K 0 . If K 0 = K then we have an equilibrium. If K 0 6 = K then I revise my initial guess for the steady state capital stock.
With the steady state capital stock, I numerically evaluate the …rst order components of the function ¢: ¢ r ; ¢ w ; ¢ R ; and ¢ ½ : This completes the solution. 
